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COMMENTS
THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE'S "AUGMENTED
ESTATE" CONCEPT: A REMEDY FOR THE NORTH
CAROLINA DISSENT STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
As our society developed, personal property gained recognition
as a major component in the American system of wealth. Our soci-
ety began as a predominantly agrarian economy where the primary
source of wealth was land.' The American society moved from this
agrarian economy to an economy where intangible property be-
came a major source of wealth.2 This intangible wealth consisted
mainly of cash, stocks, bonds, and other various types of personal
property.' As personal property became more important in our so-
ciety, decedents' estates began to contain an ever increasing per-
centage of personal property." This growing importance of personal
property resulted in state statutes recognizing the need to protect
surviving spouses against disinheritance as to that property.'
These statutes afforded the surviving spouse the opportunity to
take an elective statutory share over the share she was to receive
under the decedent's will.6
A problem has surfaced which deals with conflicts between
two compelling state interests. 7 These state interests include pro-
tecting the decedent's immediate family from disinheritance and
1. Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code:
In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981, 989 (1977).
2. Kossow, Probate Law and the Uniform Probate Code: "One For the
Money...", 61 GEo. L.J. 1357, 1382 (1973).
3. Id.
4. J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS'
ESTATES AND TRUSTS 155 (7th ed. 1988).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Comment, The North Carolina Dissent Statutes: The Seeds of Inequities
Germinate . . ., 8 CAMPBELL L. REV. 449, 449 (1986).
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protecting the decedent's interest in freedom of testation.8 Al-
though there is a strong public policy behind freedom of testation,
states have felt obligated to intrude when the surviving spouse has
been short changed.9 All states have probate laws which deal with
this policy of protecting the decedent's immediate family, espe-
cially the surviving spouse.10 Generally, these probate laws are in-
tended to provide protection from intentional and unintentional
disinheritance by the decedent." This Comment will show that
state statutes are not always effective. This Comment (1) discusses
North Carolina's dissent statute, 2 (2) shows the possible unfair-
ness the North Carolina dissent statute may cause, and (3) argues
why the Uniform Probate Code's "augmented estate" concept"3
should be incorporated in North Carolina's dissent statute.
NORTH CAROLINA'S DISSENT STATUTE'
4
The North Carolina legislature began to recognize the signifi-
cance of personal property in our society's system of wealth. The
legislature also realized the need to equilibrate the growing impor-
tance of personal wealth with the strong policy toward protecting
the surviving spouse against disinheritance. 6 This balancing pro-
cess resulted in the abolition of dower and curtesy 6 and the enact-
8. Id. at 449-50.
9. Note, Decedents' Estates-Does North Carolina Law Adequately Protect
Surviving Spouses, 48 N.C.L. REv. 361, 361 (1969-70).
10. Schmidt, Family Protection Under the Uniform Probate Code, 50 DEN.
U.L. REV. 137, 137 (1973).
11. Id.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 to -3 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
13. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 75-77 (1982) [hereinafter U.P.C.].
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 to -3 (1984 & Supp. 1989). In 1959, the North
Carolina legislature abolished the estates of dower and curtesy and enacted a dis-
sent statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-4 (1959). The North Carolina dissent statute is
similar to the elective share statute found in the Uniform Probate Code. The stat-
ute gives the surviving spouse the opportunity to dissent from the deceased
spouse's will in certain situations. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 to -3 (1984 & Supp.
1989); U.P.C. § 2-201, 8 U.L.A. 74 (1982).
15. Comment, supra note 7, at 453-54.
16. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-4 (1984). Even though dower and curtesy have
been abolished, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (1984) provides benefits of dower and
curtesy to the surviving spouse. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 provides a surviving
spouse of an intestate or a surviving spouse who dissents from a testator's will an
election to take a life interest in lieu of an intestate share. This brief overview of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 is the extent to which this Comment discusses North
Carolina's statutory dower.
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ment of Chapter 30, Article 1 of the North Carolina General Stat-
utes.17 The statutory enactment of Sections 30-1 and 30-3,' s
together with the North Carolina Intestate Succession Act,'9 pro-
vide protection for the surviving spouse in two ways.20 The surviv-
17. Comment, supra note 7, at 453-54.
18. Chapter 30 of the North Carolina General Statutes consists of § 30-1, -2,
and -3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-2 deals with the administrative and procedural as-
pects of the dissent statute and are not discussed in this Comment. For an inter-
pretation of this statute, see Tolson v. Young, 260 N.C. 506, 133 S.E.2d 135
(1963). See also In re Estate of Outen, 77 N.C. App. 818, 336 S.E.2d 436 (1985),
cert. denied, 316 N.C. 377, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986) (dealing with establishing the
right to dissent under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-2 (1984)). N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1 and
30-3 declare in part:
§ 30-1. Right to dissent. (a) A spouse may dissent from his deceased
spouse's will in those cases where the aggregate value of the provisions
under the will for benefit of the surviving spouse, when added to the
value of the property or interests in property passing in any manner
outside the will to the surviving spouse as a result of the death of the
testator:
(1) Is less than the intestate share of such
spouse, or
(2) Is less than one half of the deceased spouse's
net estate in those cases where the deceased
spouse is not survived by a child, children,
or any lineal descendant of a deceased child
or children, or by a parent, or
(3) Is less than the one half of the amount
provided by the Intestate Succession Act in
those cases where the surviving spouse is a
second or successive spouse and the testator
has surviving him lineal descendants by a
former marriage and there are no lineal
descendants surviving him by the second or
successive marriage.
§ 30-3. Effect of dissent. - (a) Upon dissent as provided for in G.S.
30-2, the surviving spouse, except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, shall take the same share of the deceased spouse's real and per-
sonal property as if the deceased had died intestate; provided, that if the
deceased spouse is not survived by a child, children, or any lineal de-
scendants of a deceased child or children, or by a parent, the surviving
spouse shall receive only one half of the deceased spouse's net estate as
defined in G.S. 29-2(5)...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a), -3(a) (1984).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 to -30 (1984 & Supp. 1989). For further discussion
of the North Carolina Intestate Succession Act, see McCall, North Carolina's
New Intestate Succession Act, 39 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1960).
20. Note, supra note 9, at 362.
1990]
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ing spouse has a qualified right to dissent from the decedent's will
and has a right to an intestate share.21 The surviving spouse is
given the opportunity to dissent from his or her deceased spouse's
will. This opportunity exists when the value of property the surviv-
ing spouse receives under the will plus the value of property pass-
ing to the surviving spouse outside the will is less than his or her
intestate share.22 A surviving spouse then has the right to dissent
from his or her deceased spouse's Will: 23
[wihere the aggregate value of the provisions under the will for
benefit of the surviving spouse, when added to the value of the
property or interests in property passing in any manner outside
the will to the surviving spouse as a result of the death of the
testator: Is less than the intestate share of such spouse. 2
A part of the section 30-1(a) calculation consists of determin-
ing the value of "property or interests in property" 25 passing to the
surviving spouse outside the decedent's will.28 The general rule is
that all property passing to the surviving spouse outside the dece-
dent's will is included in the section 30-1(a) calculation.27 Section
30-1(b) provides examples of property interests that are to be con-
sidered in this calculation.28 These property interests include, but
are not limited to: (1) the value of legal or equitable life estates, 29
21. Id.; See also Vinson v. Chappell, 275 N.C. 234, 166 S.E.2d 680 (1969)
(stating that the right of a surviving spouse to dissent from a will is conferred by
statute).
22. M. EDWARDS, NORTH CAROLINA PROBATE HANDBOOK, § 32-1, at 155 (3rd
ed. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a) (1984). For purposes of this Comment, discus-
sion is limited to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a)(1). Please note that § 30-1(a)(2)'& -
1(a)(3) provide other situations where a surviving spouse has a right to dissent.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a)(2) deals with the situation where the surviving spouse is
not survived by any children, lineal descendants of deceased children, or by any
parents. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a)(3) deals with the situation where the surviving
spouse is a second or successive spouse and the deceased spouse is survived by
lineal descedants only from a former marriage.
23. The right to dissent is vested in both husband and wife. See Fullam v.
Brock, 271 N.C. 145, 155 S.E.2d 737 (1967) (when considering the changes made
by Chapter 1209 of the 1963 Session Laws, the effect of amending N.C. CONST.,
art. X, § 6 (now § 4) was to restore the right of the husband to dissent from his
wife's will).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a)(1) (1984).
25. Id. § 30-1(a).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 30-1(b).
29. Id. § 30-1(b)(1).
[Vol. 12:425
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(2) the value of annuity proceeds, 0 (3) the value of life insurance
proceeds, 1 (4) property owned by the decedent and surviving
spouse as tenants by the entirety, 2 and (5) the value of the princi-
pal of a trust where the surviving spouse has general power of ap-
pointment over the principal. 3 Section 30-1(b) also provides an ex-
ception to the aforementioned general rule. This exception declares
that property is excluded from the section 30-1(a) calculation to
the extent the surviving spouse paid or contributed to its purchase
price. 34 These computations are used to determine the surviving
spouse's qualified right to dissent. 5
30. Id. § 30-1(b)(2).
31. Id. § 30-1(b)(3).
32. Id. § 30-1(b)(4).
33. Id. § 30-1(b)(5).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(b) (1984). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(b) provides:
(b) For the purposes of subsection (a) of this section and by way of
illustration and not of limitation, the following shall, subject to the ex-
ception hereinafter set forth, be included in the computation of the value
of the property or interests in property passing to the surviving spouse as
a result of the death of the testator:
(1) The value of a legal or equitable life estate
for the life of the surviving spouse;
(2) The value of the proceeds of an annuity for the
life of the surviving spouse;
(3) The value of proceeds of insurance policies on
the life of the decedent received by the
spouse;
(4) The value of any property passing by
survivorship, including real property owned by
the decedent and surviving spouse as tenants
by the entirety;
(5) The value of the principal of a trust under
the terms of which the surviving spouse holds
a general power of appointment over the
principal of the trust estate;
except that no property or interest in property shall be so included to the
extent that the surviving spouse or another in his behalf either gave or
donated it or paid or contributed to its purchase price.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 30-1(b) (1984).
35. See In re Estate of Conner, 5 N.C. App. 228, 168 S.E.2d 245 (1969). See
also Taylor v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 357, 271 S.E.2d 506 (1980) (A proper determina-
tion of a right to dissent cannot be established until the property passing to the
surviving spouse under and outside the will has been determined and properly
valued. Under this statute, the right to dissent is established by a mathematical
calculation).
1990] 429
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Once a valid dissent has been established, 6 section 30-3
prescribes the effect of that dissent.3 7 Under section 30-3, the dece-
dent is deemed to have died intestate and the surviving spouse re-
ceives his or her intestate share.38 Once a surviving spouse dissents
from her spouse's will, she "is entitled to exactly the same share
she would have received if he had died intestate."3 9 The decedent's
will becomes a nullity as to the surviving spouse's property inter-
ests under the will.4 0 The application of section 30-3 produces end
results which come into direct conflict with the policies underlying
the dissent statute.' Conflicts are created because the surviving
spouse is not required to renounce the non-probate assets received
outside the will.42 Therefore, the final result of section 30-3 is to
give the surviving spouse a full intestate share plus all non-probate
property received outside the will. This result causes various
problems and injustices.
UNFAIRNESS AND INJUSTICE CAUSED BY THE NORTH CAROLINA
DISSENT STATUTE
Section 30-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes was
adopted to legislatively express the public policy favoring the pro-
tection of a surviving spouse against disinheritance. 4 The dissent
36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-2 (1984).
37. Moore v. Jones, 44 N.C. App. 578, 581, 261 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1980).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(a) (1984). This Comment only considers the situa-
tion where the surviving spouse is entitled to an intestate share. Please note that
subsections 30-3(a) & .3(b) contain situations where the surviving spouse receives
something different than his or her intestate share. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(a) and
(b) provide in part:
(a) Upon dissent . . . the surviving spouse, except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, shall take the same share of the deceased
spouse's real and personal property as if the deceased had died
intestate....
(b) Whenever the surviving spouse is a second or successive spouse,
he or she shall take only one half of the amount provided by the Intes-
tate Succession Act for the surviving spouse if the testator has surviving
him lineal descendants. by a former marriage but there are no lineal de-
scendants surviving him by the second or successive marriage.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(a), -3(b) (1984).
39. Wachovia Bank & Trust v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 662, 73 S.E.2d 879, 885
(1953).
40. Id.
41. Comment, supra note 7, at 461.
42. Phillips v. Phillips, 296 N.C. 590, 605, 252 S.E.2d 761, 770 (1979).
43. Moore v. Jones, 44 N.C. App. 578, 583, 261 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1980).
[Vol. 12:425
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statute was also designed to protect the testator's freedom of testa-
tion." The surviving spouse is protected from possible disinheri-
tance through a statutory right to dissent from the deceased
spouse's will."' The decedent's freedom to distribute property at
death is protected by making the surviving spouse's right to dis-
sent a qualified right." The right to dissent is denied when the
surviving spouse has been adequately provided for outside the
will.4 7 Even though the North Carolina dissent statute seems to
provide adequate protection, the effectiveness of this protection is
questionable. Inconsistencies and defects in the North Carolina
dissent statute create troublesome and problematic loopholes in
the statute which can cause the following problems. First, a dece-
dent may intentionally or unintentionally disinherit a surviving
spouse.' 8 Secondly, a dissenting spouse may be permitted to re-
ceive a financial windfall at the expense of the other beneficiaries
under the will. 9
North Carolina's dissent statute does not take into considera-
tion lifetime transfers made by the decedent. 50 This defect pro-
vides a loophole which the decedent can use to intentionally or un-
intentionally disinherit a surviving spouse or family." A decedent
can make lifetime transfers to individuals other than the surviving
spouse. The effect of these lifetime transfers is to deplete the dece-
dent's net estate to a nominal amount.5 2 Because the surviving
spouse's elective share is based on the value of the decedent's net
estate,53 these lifetime transfers also effectively reduce that elective
44. Note, supra note 9, at 362-63. See also Phillips, 296 N.C. at 605, 252
S.E.2d at 770 (1979).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a) (1984); See also Comment, supra note 7, at 460.
46. Phillips, 296 N.C. at 605, 252 S.E.2d at 770 (1979). North Carolina is one
of a few jurisdictions which make the right to dissent a qualified right. Bolich,
Election, Dissent, and Renunciation, 39 N.C.L. REV. 17, 30 (1960).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1984); Phillips, 296 N.C. at 605, 252 S.E.2d at 770
(1979).
48. Comment, supra note 7, at 462.
49. Id. at 462; Note, supra note 9, at 365.
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1984). But see Moore v. Jones, 44 N.C. App. 578,
261 S.E.2d 289 (1980). (The decedent created a valid trust and made lifetime,
inter vivos transfers to that trust. The decedent retained extensive powers and
control over the trust property. The court held that the decedent never really
relinquished ownership of the property. Therefore, the trust should be considered
a part of his estate for determining the surviving spouse's right to dissent).
51. Comment, supra note 7, at 462.
52. Id. at 462-63.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a) (1984).
1990]
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share.54 Therefore, lifetime transfers can have the effect of disin-
heriting the surviving spouse and destroying the policies underly-
ing the dissent statute.
Other problems occur after a valid dissent has been estab-
lished. Section 30-3 entitles the surviving spouse to a full intestate
share plus all the non-probate property received outside the will.55
The North Carolina dissent statute only considers non-probate
property received when determining the qualification of a right to
dissent.5 This non-probate property is not considered when deter-
mining the surviving spouse's elective share.57 Because property re-
ceived outside the will is not considered in the elective share valua-
tion, the surviving spouse may be permitted to receive a financial
windfall.58 An example illustrates this windfall.
Buzzy, the deceased spouse, died testate leaving a net estate of
$200,000. The surviving spouse, Mary, received nothing under the
decedent's will. However, Mary received $80,000 of life insurance
proceeds that passed to her outside the will. Under section 30-1 of
the North Carolina dissent statute, one must compare two differ-
ent numbers. First, one must determine the aggregate amount of
property passing-to the surviving spouse under and outside the
will. In this example, the total amount of property passing to Mary
equals $80,000. Second, one must determine the surviving spouse's
intestate share. In this example Mary's intestate share equals
$100,000. 51 Because the aggregate amount of property Mary re-
ceived was less than her intestate share, she has a qualified right to
dissent from her deceased husband's will. 0 Once Mary has estab-
lished a valid right to dissent, section 30-3 prescribes the effect of
this dissent. 1 Mary will receive a full intestate share valued at
$100,000 in addition to the $80,000 of non-probate property she
received outside the will.
This case shows a situation where a surviving spouse is per-
54. Comment, supra note 7, at 462-63.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3 (1984); see also Note, supra'note 9, at 365.
56. Id. § 30-1(a).
57. Id. § 30-3. The Uniform Probate Code takes this non-probate property
into consideration when determining the decedent's augmented estate. This aug-
mented estate is used to determine the surviving spouse's elective share. This
topic will be discussed in detail later in this comment.
58. Comment, supra note 7, at 460-61.
59. Assume § 30-1(a) applies.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1984).
61. Id. § 30-3.
[Vol. 12:425
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mitted to dissent from her deceased husband's will. The surviving
spouse can dissent even though she is adequately provided for
through non-probate transfers. The surviving spouse is permitted
to dissent at the expense of the decedent's estate plan and the
other beneficiaries under the will.2 Applying sections 30-1 and 30-
3 in determining the right to dissent and the surviving spouse's
elective share defeats the policies underlying the dissent statute.6 8
These competing policies include the protection of the surviving
spouse from disinheritance and the protection of the decedent's
right to distribute property at death.' Applying standards to es-
tablish the right to dissent that differ from the standards applied
to show the dissent's effect destroys all policies underlying the
statute.6 The application of these different standards destroys the
process of balancing these competing public policies.6 The injus-
tice and unfairness caused by the North Carolina dissent statute
can be easily shown. The difference of even one dollar between
non-probate property received and the surviving spouse's intestate
share will cause a financial windfall for the surviving spouse. 7
To magnify the ineffectiveness of the North Carolina dissent
statute, consider the same example that was given above except
increase the values involved. Assume the decedent's net estate is
valued at $4,000,000. Also, assume the surviving spouse receives
$1,999,999 in non-probate property that passed to her outside the
will. The surviving spouse's intestate share is valued at $2,000,000.
Because the amount of property the surviving spouse received
under and outside the will is less than her intestate share, she can
dissent. Applying section 30-3 results in the surviving spouse re-
ceiving both her intestate share and the non-probate property.6 8 In
this hypothetical, the surviving spouse receives a financial windfall.
The surviving spouse is permitted to dissent from the will when
she has been more than adequately provided for outside the will.
The North Carolina dissent statute's overprotection of the
surviving spouse results in the destruction of the decedent's testa-
mentary intent and the destruction of the other beneficiaries' in-
62. Comment, supra note 7, at 461-62.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 462.
65. Id.
66. Note, supra note 9, at 365.
67. Id.
68. N.C. GEN STAT. § 30-3 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
1990]
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terests e9 The North Carolina dissent statute's inconsistencies are
caused by the insufficient legislative attention given to the prop-
erty interests that vest in the surviving spouse. 0 These property
interests include both inter vivos and testamentary transfers the
surviving spouse received before and at the decedent's death. The
next part of this Comment will discuss a concept which appears to
be a reasonable way to correct these inconsistencies.
AUGMENTED ESTATE CONCEPT OF THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) is an act containing various
rules, regulations and general provisions "relating to the affairs of
decedents. . ." These general provisions pertain to the adminis-
tration of decedents' estates along with the distribution of the es-
tate property. 72 The underlying purposes of the UPC are:
(1) to simplify and clarify the law concerning
the affairs of decedents'... ;
(2) to discover and make effective the intent
of a decedent in distribution of his property;
(3) to promote a speedy and efficient system for
liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to
his successors;
(4) to facilitate use and enforcement of certain
trusts;
(5) to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions.73
The UPC provision which has caused the most controversy is the
"augmented estate" concept adopted in the UPC's elective share
statute.74
Under the UPC's elective share statute, 5 the surviving spouse
has a right to elect a one-third share of the decedent's "augmented
estate. ' 76 One of the major goals of the UPC's elective share stat-
ute is to protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance." While
providing this protection, this statute also tries to balance the
69. Comment, supra note 7, at 462.
70. Note, supra note 9, at 366.
71. U.P.C., 8 U.L.A. 5 (1982).
72. Id.
73. U.P.C. § 1-102(b), 8 U.L.A. 24-25 (1982).
74. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 981.
75. U.P.C. § 2-201, 8 U.L.A. 74-75 (1982).
76. U.P.C. § 2-201(a), 8 U.L.A. 74 (1982).
77. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 982 n.6.
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competing interests of the other beneficiaries and the decedent's
freedom to distribute property at death.78 The North Carolina dis-
sent statute also tries to achieve these same goals.7 9 However, when
computing the decedent's gross estate and elective share amounts,
the UPC considers certain transfers of property the North Caro-
lina statute ignores.80 These transfers include certain property the
decedent transferred inter vivos and certain property the surviving
spouse received from the decedent."
The Commissioners of the UPC recognized that a substantial
amount of wealth was being transmitted outside the will.2 The
Commissioners determined, therefore, that the surviving spouse's
elective share should be based on an estate value that included
more than general probate assets.8 3 This estate value should also
include certain transfers that were seen as testamentary substi-
tutes as well as property the surviving spouse received from the
decedent.8 '
The comment to section 2-202 of the UPC states the purpose
of this augmented estate concept and the goals the Commissioners
hoped to achieve.85 These goals are twofold:
(1) to prevent the owner of wealth from making arrangements
which transmit his property to others by means other than pro-
bate deliberately to defeat the right of the surviving spouse to a
share, and (2) to prevent the surviving spouse from electing a
share of the probate estate when the spouse has received a fair
share of the total wealth of the decedent either during the life-
time of the decedent or at death by life insurance, joint tenancy
assets and other nonprobate arrangements.
The combination of a statutory elective share and an augmented
estate concept serves a dual purpose.8 7 First, this combination pre-
vents the surviving spouse from being deprived of a "fair share" of
78. Id.
79. See Comment, supra note 7, at 460.
80. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 981-82; U.P.C. § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 75-77 (1982).
81. Id.
82. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1015.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. U.P.C. § 2-202 comment, 8 U.L.A. 77-78 (1982).
86. Id.
87. Estate of Carman v. Carman, 213 Neb. 98, -, 327 N.W.2d 611, 613
(1982) (citing NFB. REv. STAT. § 30-2313 to -2315 (1982)).
1990] 435
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the decedent's estate.8 8 This deprivation is prevented by providing
the surviving spouse protection against lifetime transfers used to
deplete the decedent's estate.89 Secondly, this combination pre-
vents the receipt of a financial windfall by the surviving spouse.' 0
The surviving spouse is precluded from receiving transfers outside
the decedent's will while also having the ability to elect against the
will."
Section 2-202 of the UPC defines how the augmented estate is
computed for elective share purposes. 2 Section 2-202 consists of a
two part calculation. First, the decedent's net estate is reduced
by (1) funeral and administration expenses, (2) homestead al-
lowances, (3) family allowances and exemptions, and (4) enforcea-
ble claims.' 4 This value represents the traditional net probate es-
tate. Second, certain amounts must be added back to the net
probate estate.' The first of these amounts to be added back rep-
resents the value of lifetime transfers the decedent made to other
persons besides the surviving spouse.' 6 These transfers include (a)
transfers where the decedent retains a life estate, 7 (b) transfers
where the decedent retains the power of revocation, 8 (c) transfers
that create joint tenancies with the right of survivorship, 99 and (d)
transfers made to a beneficiary within two years of the decedent's
death where the aggregate transfers are in excess of $3,000.100 The
second of these amounts to be added back represents the value of
certain property associated with the surviving spouse and certain
transfers of this property.
By adding back certain inter vivos transfers, the UPC defeats
the decedent's intentional attempt to use a will substitute to avoid
the elective share statute.101 Also, the surviving spouse is prevented
"from electing a share of the probate estate when the spouse has
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. U.P.C. § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 75-77 (1982).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 75-76 (1982).
97. U.P.C. § 2-202(1)(i), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
98. U.P.C. § 2-202(1)(ii), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
99. U.P.C. § 2-202(1)(iii), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
100. U.P.C. § 2-202(1)(iv), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
101. Kossow, supra note 2, at 1390.
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received a fair share of the total wealth of the decedent either dur-
ing the lifetime of the decedent or at death...,""o As a result, cer-
tain'03 property owned or transferred by the surviving spouse
which was derived from the decedent is treated as a credit against
the elective share.10 4
A. Certain Lifetime Transfers
Section 2-202(1) establishes four inter vivos transfers to do-
nees other than the surviving spouse that must be added back to
the augmented estate.10 5 The UPC refused to allow certain trans-
fers made by the decedent to adversely affect the surviving
spouse's rights. 0 6 These transfers specifically include those where
the decedent retains some control or beneficial interest over the
transferred property.10 7 These types of transfers are included in
the decedent's augmented estate when the transfer is made to any
person other than the surviving spouse.'08 These transfers must be
made by the decedent during his marriage to the surviving
spouse. 0 9 Also, the augmented estate includes these transfers only
to the extent the decedent did not receive adequate and full con-
sideration for the property transferred."10
102. Id. at 1391.
103. As will be discussed later in this Comment, "certain" property repre-
sents that property which the surviving spouse owned at the decedent's death
plus that property transferred by the surviving spouse to persons other than the
decedent. This property must be derived from the decedent and is includible in
the augmented estate to the extent the surviving spouse did not pay adequate and
full consideration. U.P.C. § 2-202(2), 8 U.L.A. 76-77 (1982).
104. Kossow, supra note 2, at 1390-91.
105. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1018; see also U.P.C. § 2-201(1), 8 U.L.A. 75-76
(1982).
106. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1018.
107. Id.
108. U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 75-76 (1982).
109. Id.
110. The specific language of U.P.C. § 2-202(1) provides in part:
The augmented estate means the estate reduced by funeral and ad-
ministrative expenses, homestead allowance, family allowances and ex-
emptions, and enforceable claims, to which is added the sum of the fol-
lowing amounts:
(1) The value of property transferred to anyone other than a bona
fide purchaser by the decedent at any time during marriage, to or for the
benefit of any person other than the surviving spouse, to the extent that
the decedent did not receive adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth for the transfer, if the transfer is of any of the following
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1. Retained Beneficial Interest
The augmented estate includes any transfer made by the dece-
dent where the decedent retains at his death (1) possession or en-
joyment of the property, or (2) the right to income from the prop-
erty.111 Again, these transfers must be made by the decedent
during marriage and to persons other than the surviving spouse.11
These transfers are included only to the extent the decedent did
not receive adequate and full consideration. 3 Such transfers are
nothing more than will substitutes used to avoid the surviving
spouse's elective share. The UPC prevents the decedent from using
a retained life estate as a means of avoiding the property's inclu-
sion in his augmented estate.
2. Retained Power of Revocation
The augmented estate also includes any transfers made by the
decedent114 in which the decedent "[retained at the time of his
death a power, either alone or in conjuction with any other person,
to revoke or to consume, invade or dispose of the principal for his
own benefit. . ." " Because of the decedent's retained power of
revocation, the donee's interest is nothing but speculative in na-
types:
(i) any transfer under which the decedent retained at the time of his
death the possession or enjoyment of, or right to income from, the
property;
(ii) any transfer to the extent that the decedent detained at the time
of his death a power, either alone or in conjunction with any other per-
son, to revoke or to consume, invade or dispose of the principal for his
own benefit;
(iii) any transfer whereby property is held at the time of decedent's
death by decedent and another with right of survivorship;
(iv) any transfer made to a donee within two years of death of the
decedent to the extent that the aggregate transfers to any one donee in
either of the years exceed $3,000.00.
U.P.C. § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 75-76 (1982).
111. U.P.C. § 2-202(1)(i), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
112. U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
113. Id.
114. As stated before, these transfers must be made to persons other than the
surviving spouse and during the period of marriage to the surviving spouse. The
transfers are included only to the extent the decedent did not receive adequate
and full consideration. U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 75-76 (1982).
115. U.P.C. § 2-202(1)(ii), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
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ture.116 Therefore, the decedent has not relinquished control over
the property necessary to avoid inclusion in his augmented estate.
Section 2-202(1)(ii) applies whether the power to revoke is re-
tained solely in the decedent or whether the power is retained in
conjunction with another person." For example, X transfers prop-
erty to T in trust. The income from the trust is paid to Y for life
and upon Y's death, the trust principal is distributed to Z. X re-
tains the power to revoke or amend the terms of the trust, but any
revocation or amendment is effective only with the consent of Z.
Even though X's power of revocation requires the consent of Z,
X's augmented estate still includes the trust property."'
3. Joint Tenancy Property
Section 2-202(1)(iii) states that the augmented estate shall in-
clude any transfer made by the decedent' 9 "whereby property is
held at the time of decedent's death by decedent and another with
right of survivorship. .. "110 Section 1-202(33) defines "property"
as including both real and personal property or any type of
equivalent property interest.'2 ' This section is not limited to the
more common joint property interests dealing with real property.
This section also includes joint tenancies in personal property such
as bank accounts and other investment properties. 2 2 Also, this sec-
tion only applies to transfers made by the decedent.'23 No transfer,
therefore, is included in the decedent's augmented estate to the
extent the decedent did not contribute to the joint tenancy.'24 For
example, X and Y both contribute $5,000 each to a joint bank ac-
count. If Y predeceases X, only Y's contribution of $5,000 is in-
cluded in Y's augmented estate. 25 Likewise, if X had transferred
116. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1027.
117. U.P.C. § 2-202(1)(ii), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
118. Example adopted from Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1028. See also Helvering
v. City Bank Farmers Trust, 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
119. These transfers must be made to persons other than the surviving
spouse and during the period of marriage to the surviving spouse. The transfers
are included only to the extent the decedent did not receive adequate and full
consideration for the property transferred. U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 75-76
(1982).
120. U.P.C. § 2-202(1)(iii), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
121. U.P.C. § 1-201(33), 8 U.L.A. 33 (1982).
122. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1030.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c) example 2 (1989).
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the full $10,000 to the bank account, no portion of that money
would be included in Y's augmented estate.12 6
4. Transfers in Contemplation of Death
The augmented estate includes any transfer made by the dece-
dent to a donee other than the surviving spouse within two years
of the decedent's death.127 These transfers -are included in the de-
cedent's augmented estate to the extent that the aggregate trans-
fers to any single individual exceed $3,000.123 The augmented es-
tate captures the value of the transferred property except where
the decedent receives adequate and full consideration for that
property.129
Section 2-202(1)(iv) applies whether or not the decedent re-
tains any beneficial interest or control over the property. 3 This
section captures transfers that may escape inclusion under sections
2-202(1)(i) and 2-202(1)(ii).13 1 The two year rule under this section
is a hard and fast rule. The decedent's motives or purposes for
making a particular transfer so close to his death are irrelevant
and are not considered.13 2
This section does contain a problem or loophole which de-
stroys most of its effectiveness. This loophole allows the decedent
to defeat the surviving spouse's elective share.133 The decedent can
make several different $3,000 transfers to children or other donees
during the two year period.134 These small, but numerous, transfers
126. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c) example 3 (1989). See also Kurtz, supra note
1, at 1030-31. Please note that all joint tenancy property received by the decedent
as a gift or inheritance should be excluded from the decedent's augmented estate.
This exclusion is based on the fact that the decedent made no contribution to the
property. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1031.
127. As required in the past three types of transfers, these transfers also
must be made during the decedent's marriage to the surviving spouse.
128. U.P.C. § 2-202(1)(iv), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982). The U.P.C. statute provides in
part:
(iv) any transfer made to a donee within two years of death of dece-
dent to the extent the aggregate transfers to any one donee in either of
the years exceed $3,000.00.
U.P.C. § 2-202(1)(iv), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
129. U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 75-76 (1982).
130. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1032.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1032-33.
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will substantially and effectively deplete the decedent's augmented
estate. This decrease in the decedent's augmented estate results in
a decrease in the surviving spouse's elective share.
5. Exceptions
Section 2-202(1) contains two major exceptions to the general
rule of including certain decedent transfers in the augmented es-
tate calculation. 13 5 First, a transfer is excluded from the aug-
mented estate "if made with the written consent or joinder of the
surviving spouse.""' The decedent effectively avoids the trans-
ferred property's inclusion in his augmented estate by obtaining
his spouse's written consent or by having her join in the transfer. 13 7
Second, the augmented estate excludes any life insurance, accident
insurance, joint annuities, or pensions that are payable to a donee
other than the surviving spouse."8' The comment of section 2-202
states that these types of transfers are not included because they
are generally not used to deplete the decedent's estate.139
Commentators see the second exception as a means to effec-
tively avoid the surviving spouse's elective share. The decedent has
the ability to purchase a single premium life insurance policy
which substantially decreases his estate's value."0O By naming
someone other than his spouse as the beneficiary of that insurance
policy, the decedent has greatly reduced the surviving spouse's
elective share."' Also, the decedent can use a joint annuity as a
means to transfer his property to persons other than his spouse,
while retaining a current beneficial interest in the property."" Be-
cause the annuity payments pass to a person other than the surviv-
135. U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 75-76 (1982).
136. Id.; U.P.C. § 2-202(1) provides in part:
Any transfer is excluded if made with the written consent or joinder
of the surviving spouse....
U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
137. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1034.
138. U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 75-76 (1982); U.P.C. § 2-202(1) provides in
part:
Nothing herein shall cause to be included in the augmented estate
any life insurance, accident insurance, joint annuity, or pension payable
to a person other than the surviving spouse.
U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
139. U.P.C. § 2-202 comment, 8 U.L.A. 78 (1982).
140. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1035.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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ing spouse at the decedent's death, this transfer effectively avoids
the augmented estate. However, the joint annuity exception con-
flicts with section 2-202(1)(i)" 8 which states that the augmented
estate includes "any transfer under which the decedent retained at
the time of his death the... right to income from, the property..
" 4 The UPC's commentary also states that whether or not the
transfer was made before or during marriage to the surviving
spouse is irrelevant. 1"
B. Property Owned by the Surviving Spouse
Section 2-202(2) of the UPC considers the surviving spouse's
property derived from the decedent in the elective share computa-
tion.14 1 Inclusion of the property derived from the decedent in the
decedent's augmented estate serves two main purposes.14 7 First,
the property the surviving spouse receives from the decedent dur-
ing marriage becomes a credit against her elective share. 48 Sec-
ondly, where the surviving spouse is adequately provided for
outside the will, her ability to share in property passing to others
under the will is impaired.1 4 9
Under section 2-202(2), the augmented estate includes various
types of property. The augmented estate includes the value of
property the surviving spouse owns at the decedent's death.150 The
augmented estate also includes property the surviving spouse
transferred to persons other than the decedent if the property
"would have been includible in the [surviving] spouse's augmented
143. Id.
144. U.P.C. § 2-202(1)(i), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982). See also Kurtz, supra note 1, at
1035.
145. U.P.C. § 2-202 comment, 8 U.L.A. 78 (1982).
146. U.P.C. § 2-202(2), 8 U.L.A. 76-77 (1982). The statute provides in part:
(2) The value of property owned by the surviving spouse at the dece-
dent's death, plus the value of property transferred by the spouse at any
time during marriage to any person other than the decedent which would
have been includible in the spouse's augmented estate if the surviving
spouse had predeceased the decedent to the extent the owned or trans-
ferred property is derived from the decedent by any means other than
testate or intestate succession without a full consideration in money or
money's worth....
U.P.C. § 2-202(2), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
147. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1036-37.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. U.P.C. § 2-202(2), 8 U.L.A. 76-77 (1982).
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estate if the surviving spouse had predeceased the decedent..."151
The primary purpose behind this statutory language is to capture
those transfers in which the surviving spouse has retained some
beneficial enjoyment.15 Similar to section 2-202(1), this statutory
language also implies that the augmented estate excludes property
where the decedent consented to or joined in the transfer. " Prop-
erty the surviving spouse obtains from the decedent by will or
through intestate succession is also excluded.1 54 The exclusion of
this property is based on the fact that the property will already be
a part of the decedent's augmented estate as probate property. 5'
Finally, this property is includible in the augmented estate only to
the extent the spouse did not receive adequate and full considera-
tion for the transfer.'56
Life insurance proceeds are not included in the augmented es-
tate under section 2-202(1) because life insurance is generally not
purchased to avoid the elective share statute.15 7 However, under
section 2-202(2), life insurance proceeds payable to the surviving
spouse are included "because it seems unfair to allow a surviving
spouse to disturb the decedent's estate plan if the spouse has re-
ceived ample provision from life insurance."'' 5  Other forms of
property that are caught by this section include the following:
"property appointed to the spouse by the decedent's exercise of a
general or special power of appointment also exercisable in favor of
others than the spouse;"" lump sum annuity payments attributa-
ble to premiums paid by the decedent;160 amounts payable after
decedent's death from pension plans;' 6 ' disability compensation;162
death benefits or retirement plans (exclusive of Federal Social Se-
curity System); 6 - community property when applicable;6 and
151. Id.; Please note that these transfers by the surviving spouse must have
been made during marriage to the decedent, similar to § 2-202(1).
152. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1037.
153. Id.; See Statutory exceptions under § 2-202(1).
154. U.P.C. § 2-202(2), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
155. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1037.
156. U.P.C. § 2-202(2), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1982).
157. U.P.C. § 2-202 comment, 8 U.L.A. 78 (1982).
158. Id.; See Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1040.
159. U.P.C. § 2-202(2)(i), 8 U.L.A. 76-77 (1982).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
1990] 443
19
Munn: The Uniform Probate Code's "Augmented Estate" Concept: A Remedy f
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1990
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
property held by both the decedent and surviving spouse as joint
tenants with right of survivorship.165
C. Application
Under the UPC, the surviving spouse may elect one-third of
the value of the decedent's augmented estate. Proponents argue
that this system serves both competing policies by disallowing both
(1) disinheritance of a spouse, and (2) a financial windfall by the
surviving spouse. For this reason, North Carolina should strongly
consider adopting the augmented estate provision of the UPC.
If the North Carolina legislature adopts the augmented estate
concept over the current dissent legislation, the results of the ex-
amples given previously in this Comment will be different. In the
first example, Mary would not have received a financial windfall at
the expense of the other beneficiaries and the decedent's estate
plan. The augmented estate would include not only the probate
assets of $200,000, but also the life insurance proceeds of $80,000
that Mary received outside the will. The value of the augmented
estate would be $280,000 and Mary's elective share would total
$93,333. The life insurance proceeds would have been properly
charged against the surviving spouse's elective share and she would
only share in the probate assets to the extent of $13,333 rather
165. Id. § 2-202(2)(i) provides in part:
For purposes of this paragraph [2-202(2)]:
(i) Property derived from the decedent includes, but is not limited
to, any beneficial interest of the surviving spouse in a trust created by
the decedent during his lifetime, any property appointed to the spouse
by the decedent's exercise of a general or special power of appointment
also exercisable in favor of others than the spouse, any proceeds of insur-
ance (including accidental death benefits) on the life of the decedent at-
tributable to premiums paid by him, any lump sum immediately payable
and the commuted value of the proceeds of annuity contracts under
which the decedent was the primary annuitant attributable to premiums
paid by him, the commuted value of amounts payable after the dece-
dent's death under any public or private pension, disability compensa-
tion, death benefit or retirement plan, exclusive of the Federal Social Se-
curity system, by reason of service performed or disabilities incurred by
the decedent, any property held at the time of decedent's death by dece-
dent and the surviving spouse with right of survivorship, any property
held by decedent and transferred by contract to the surviving spouse by
reason of the decedent's death and the value of the share of the surviving
spouse resulting from rights in community property in this or any other
state formerly owned with the decedent...
U.P.C. § 2-202(2)(i), 8 U.L.A. 76-77 (1982).
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than $100,000. This calculation prevents the surviving spouse from
receiving a financial windfall when she has been adequately pro-
vided for outside the will.
A better example of showing how the augmented estate con-
cept eliminates unfairness and injustice is to apply this concept to
the second hypothetical that was used to magnify the ineffective-
ness of the North Carolina dissent statute. Under that hypotheti-
cal, the surviving spouse received her intestate share of $2,000,000
of the $4,000,000 net estate plus the $1,999,999 of non-probate
property she received outside the will. If the augmented estate pro-
visions are applied to this situation, the augmented estate will be
calculated to include both the $4,000,000 of probate property and
the $1,999,999 of non-probate property. The surviving spouse's
one-third elective share will equal $1,999,999, whereby the non-
probate assets she received outside the will serve as a complete
credit against her elective share and the decedent's estate plan is
not disturbed.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina legislature tried to establish rules that
protect the surviving spouse against intentional or unintentional
disinheritance. At the same time, the legislature tried to provide
the testator with the freedom to distribute his or her property at
death. Even though the legislature has tried to balance these two
competing interests, the statutes enacted fall well short of this bal-
ancing goal and are basically ineffective. This ineffectiveness and
inconsistency in the North Carolina dissent statute is caused by
the less than adequate legislative attention given to the non-pro-
bate property interests that vest in the surviving spouse at the de-
ceased spouse's death. "
The UPC's augmented estate concept provides an effective
remedy for the loopholes present in the North Carolina dissent
statute. The augmented estate concept is more effective because it
considers property interests that the North Carolina dissent stat-
ute fails to recognize. The augmented estate includes certain life-
time transfers made by the decedent to individuals other than the
surviving spouse in the calculation of the elective share. 167 The in-
clusion of this property protects the surviving spouse against possi-
166. Note, supra note 9, at 366.
167. U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 75-76 (1982).
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ble disinheritance. 68 The augmented estate calculation also in-
cludes property the surviving spouse derives from the decedent. "
To the extent the surviving spouse has been adequately provided
for outside the will, she will not be permitted to diminish other
beneficiaries' shares under the will. The inclusion of this property
provides protection against the surviving spouse receiving a finan-
cial windfall at the expense of the other beneficiaries.'10 This pro-
vision also maintains the decedent's freedom of testation.17 1
The augmented estate concept is not free of any and all loop-
holes. Some loopholes appear in the exclusion of life insurance pro-
ceeds and joint annuities payable to persons other than the surviv-
ing spouse from the elective share calculation. 72 However, the
loopholes that appear in the augmented estate concept are few and
generally are not used for the purpose of avoiding the elective
share.17' The North Carolina legislature should strongly consider
an amendment to the dissent statutes in order to statutorily en-
compass the Uniform Probate Code's augmented estate concept.
Charles H. Munn, Jr.
168. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1059.
169. U.P.C. § 2-202(2), 8 U.L.A. 76-77 (1982).
170. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1060.
171. Id.
172. U.P.C. § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 75-76 (1982).
173. U.P.C. § 2-202 comment, 8 U.L.A. 78 (1982).
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